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FURTHER THOUGHTS ON KANTER AND BALLARD 
By Steve R. Johnson 
Steve R. Johnson is the E.L. Wiegand Professor at 
the William S. Boyd School of Law, University of 
·,Nevada, Las Vegas. This article arose out of the 
· .. author's participation in a program on the Kanter and 
Ballard cases on October 1, 2004, given by the Court 
.· Procedure and Practice Committee of the American 
Bar Association Section of Taxation. For stimulating 
perspectives (sometimes agreeing, sometimes dis-
: agreeing with his views), the author thanks the pro-
gram audience and his co-panelists: Joshua Odintz, 
Michael Saltzman, Leandra Lederman, and Allen 
Madison. Some of the research in this article was 
Madison's. Of course, any errors in this article are the 
author's, not Madi~on's or anyone else's. The author 
also thanks his colleagues at the Boyd School of Law 
·for their suggestions and comments. 
The Supreme Court is about to hear arguments in 
. these consolidated cases. They involve constitutional 
and statutory challenges to the Tax Court's application 
of its Rule 183 in a controversial unreported income 
and fraud case. The author argues that the decisions of 
·the Tax Court and of three circuit courts rejecting those 
challenges are correct under the law and are well 
··founded in important policies as to the operation of 
the courts. 
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TAX NOTES, November 29, 2004 
On December 7, 2004, the Supreme Court will hear 
oral arguments in the consolidated Kanter and Ballard 
cases.1 The Tax Court had substantially upheld the IRS's 
determinations of large deficiencies and fraud penalties 
against several taxpayers.2 The taxpayers argued in part 
that the Tax Court's application of its Rule 183 violated 
both due process and applicable statutes. I disagreed 
with those arguments then,3 and I continue to do so now. 
On appeal, the taxpayers' challenges to Rule 183 were 
rejected by the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits.4 The 
decisions of those circuits are sound and should be 
affirmed. 
Both an affirmative case and a negative case can be 
made in favor of the decisions. The affirmative case 
consists of the values that the current regime reflects, 
values that would be compromised by accepting the 
taxpayers' arguments. The negative case responds to the 
constitutional and statutory content; )ns raised by the 
taxpayers and others . 
This article has five parts. Part I recounts the proce-
dural context and pertinent facts of the cases. Parts II and 
III develop the affirmative case. Affirming the decisions 
would support the process values that courts speak 
through their opinions and it is inappropriate to go 
behind opinions to examine judges' thought processes or 
motivations (Part II), and that courts should be able to 
craft rules that reflect their needs and safeguard their 
internal deliberative processes (Part III). 
Parts N and V present the negative case. They do not 
address every point raised by the taxpayers and others 
but instead focus on particularly instructive parts of the 
arguments. Part N considers the due process arguments. 
It maintains in part that the taxpayers inappropriately 
1The Supreme Court granted certiorari in these cases at 124 
S. Ct. 2065 and 2066 (2004) . 
2Investment Research Associates Ltd. v. Commissioner, T.C. 
Memo. 1999-407, 78 T.C.M. 95, Doc 1999-39247, 1999 TNT 241-4, 
241-5 (1999). 
3Quoted by David Lupi-Sher and Sheryl Stratton, "Tax Bar 
Divided on Taxpayers' Attempt to Obtain STJ's Report," Tax 
Notes, Feb. 12, 2001, p. 865 at 868-869. 
4Estate of Lisle v. Commissioner, 341 F.3d 364, Doc 2003-17787, 
2003TNT148-12 (5th Cir. 2003); Estate of Kanter v. Commissioner, 
337 F.3d 833, Doc 2003-17426, 2003 TNT 144-23 (7th Cir . 
2003)(per curiam), rehearing and rehearing en bane denied; Ballard 
v. Commissioner, 321 F.3d 1037, Doc 2003-4416, 2003 TNT 34-19 
(11th Cir. 2003), rehearing and rehearing en bane denied 67 Fed. 
Appx. 590 (2003). · 
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conflate evaluation of witness credibility and the smaller, 
included notion of evaluation of witness demeanor, and 
that the taxpayers seek to impose procedural inflexibility 
that the due process component of the Fifth Amendment 
has never required and does not require today Part V 
considers the statutory arguments and the policy of 
judicial transparency. It argues that Rule 183 is consistent 
with existing statutes, and that, if the rule is to be 
changed, the agent of change should be Congress, not the 
Supreme Court. 
I. Background 
A. Special Trial Judges 
The 19 judges of the Tax Court are appointed by the 
president with the advice and consent of the Senate, for 
15-year terms.5 In contrast, special trial judges (S1Js) are 
appointed by the chief judge of the Tax Court and have 
no statutorily mandated tenure.6 The chief judge may 
assign several types of cases to S1Js: declaratory judg-
ment proceedings, cases involving amounts under 
$50,000, collectio11 due process cases, and "any other 
proceeding which the chief judge may designate."7 
"[S]ubject to such conditions and review as the [Tax 
Court] may provide," the STJ is authorized to render the 
decision for the court in all but the last of the above types 
of cases.8 In the last type, the case may be assigned to the 
S1J for hearing but it must be assigned to a "regular" 
judge (the judge) for decision.9 Kanter, Ballard, and re-
lated cases are of that type. 
The roles of the S1J and the judge in cases like ours are 
set out in Tax Court Rule 183. That rule has undergone 
evolution. The current version of Rule 183 has been in 
place since 1984.10 In pertinent part, it provides that an 
S1J "shall conduct the trial"11 and, after the parties have 
filed their briefs, "shall submit a report, including find-
ings of fact and opinion, to the Chief Judge, and the Chief 
Judge will assign the case to a judge [for decision]."12 The 
judge 
may adopt the [S1J's] report or may modify it or 
may reject it in whole or in part, or may direct the 
filing of additional briefs or may receive further 
evidence or may direct oral argument, or may 
recommit the report with instructions. Due regard 
shall be given to the circumstance that the [S1J] had 
the opportunity to evaluate the credibility of wit-
nesses, and the findings of fact recommended by 
the [S1J] shall be presumed to be correct.13 
5Section 7443. 6Section 7443A. 7Section 7443A(b). 
8Section 7443(c). 
9The Supreme Court confirmed this reading of the relevant 
statutes in Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 873-77 (1991). 
10See Amendments to Rules of Practice and Procedure of the 
United States Tax Court, 81 T.C. 1043, 1069 (1983). 
11Tax Ct. R. 183(a). 
12Id. R. l83(b). 13Id. R. 183(c). 
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Before 1984 the rule (then numbered as Rule 182) provided that the S1J would "file" the report (as oppos d 
to "submit" it as under current Rule 183).14 Under t~ 
for~er rule, the S1J' s origU:al repor~ was served on th: 
parties and they were pernntted to file exceptions to it 15 
The Tax Court did not explain its reasons for chang~ 
the rule. However, the court's comment regarding thg 
new rule did state: "The prior provisions for service 0~ 
the [S1J's] report on each party and for the filing of 
exceptions to that report have been deleted."16 
B. Kanter and Ballard 
Burton Kanter was a prominent tax attorney. Claude 
Ballard and Robert Lisle were vice presidents of Pruden-
tial Life Insurance Co. The IRS alleged that Kanter 
Ballard, and Lisle participated in a scheme in whicl~ 
persons who sought to do business with Prudential paid 
kickbacks to Kanter, which were divided among Ballard 
Lisle, and Kanter. The IRS further alleged that the thre~ 
funnelled the kickbacks through a complex web of trusts, 
partnerships, and corporations. The IRS issued notices of 
deficiency determining, in addition to about 40 other 
adjustments, that millions of dollars of kickbacks and 
other income had been improperly omitted from the 
taxpayers' income tax returns. Later, the IRS asserted civil 
fraud penalties. 
The taxpayers filed Tax Court petitions. The chief 
judge of the Tax Court assigned the cases for hearing to 
Special Trial Judge Irvin Couvillion. A lengthy and con· 
tentious trial ensued. The trial lasted almost five weeks 
and produced a transcript exceeding 5,400 pages. The 
parties' briefs totaled nearly 4,700 pages, and the court 
"plodded through thousands of exhibits containing hun-
dreds of thousands of pages."17 
After the trial, the S1J submitted a report on the 
consolidated cases to the chief judge as required by Tax 
Court Rule 183(b ). The chief judge assigned the cases, 
again under Rule 183(b), to Judge Howard Dawson for 
decision. On December 15, 1999, the Tax Court issued its 
decision. The decision stated: "The Court agrees with the 
opinion of the Special Trial Judge, which is set forth 
below."18 The Tax Court substantially upheld the IRS's 
determinations. It held that "[a]s a result of the overall 
scheme, over $13 million of kickback and other income 
was omitted by [the taxpayers] collectively."19 The court 
also upheld fraud penalties on Lisle, Ballard, and Kanter. 
14Former Tax Ct. R. 182(b), 60 T.C. 1149 (1973). Federal Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 10 requires that the record on app.eal 
include "the original papers and exhibits filed in the [trial] 
court." The Seventh Circuit held that, under the current rnle, an 
STJ's original report is a "preliminary finding[] or report[]" and 
need not be included in the record on appeal. Kanter, supra note 
4, 337 F.3d at 842. 1 15Former Rule 182, and so portions surviving in current Ru e 
183, was "intended ... to provide procedures more comparabJ~ 
to those which obtain in the Court of Claims." 60 T.C. 1057, 11. 
(1976). For discussion of former Rule 182, see Stone v. Commts-
sioner, 865 F.2d 342, 344-48 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 1681 T.C. at 1070. 171999 TNT 241-4 para. 407. c 
18Id. para. 1. 
19Id. para. 646. ' 
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There followed rounds of posttrial motions. They 
focused on the taxpayers' suspicion that the court's 
opinion came to conclusions more adverse to them than 
those originally reached by the STJ. Specifically,20 
" In April 2000 the taxpayers moved for access to "all 
reports, draft opinions or similar documents, pre-
pared and delivered to the Court pursuant to Rule 
183(b )" or, in the alternative, that the Tax Court 
either certify the issue for interlocutory appeal or 
make the STJ' s original findings part of the record 
for appeal. On April 26, 2000, Judge Dawson denied 
the motion. His order stated that, in his decision for 
the court, he had given "due regard to the fact that 
[the STJ] evaluated the credibility of the witnesses ... 
and treated the findings of fact recommended by the 
(STJ] as being presumptively correct."21 
• In May 2001 the taxpayers filed a motion asking that 
the STJ's original report be placed under seal and 
made part of the record for appeal. That motion was 
denied on May 30, 2000. 
" In August 2000 the taxpayers filed a motion asking 
the Tax Court to reconsider its denials of the previ-
ous motions or, in the alternative, to grant a new 
trial. In support of the motion, the taxpayers sub-
mitted an affidavit from one of their lawyers. The 
affidavit stated that the lawyer had been ap-
proached by at least two Tax Court judges (not 
identified in the affidavit),22 who said that "substan-
tial sections of the opinion were not written by [the 
STJ], and that those sections containing findings 
related to the credibility of witnesses and findings 
related to fraud were wholly contrary to the find-
ings made by [the STJ] in his report."23 The affidavit 
also alleged that the court's findings regarding 
fraud were made by the judge and that what the 
lawyer had been told by the two judges was con-
firmed by what he was told by yet a third uniden-
tified judge.24 
On August 30, 2000, the Tax Court issued an order 
denying that motion. The order stated that "contrary to 
the contents of the affidavit, the underlying report 
adopted by the Tax Court is, in fact, [the STJ's] report." 
The order was signed by the judge, the STJ, and the chief 
judge. 
" Subsequently, the taxpayers petitioned an appellate 
court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the Tax 
Court to provide taxpayers with a copy of the 
original STJ's report or, in the alternative, to require 
the Tax Court to provide any changes made by the 
judge to the STJ' s original report. The petition was 
denied. 
There followed the three unsuccessful appeals. The 
Fifth Circuit affirmed regarding the Rule 183 issues by a 
20The following history is drawn from Ballard, supra note 4, 
321 F.3d at 1040-41. 21Doc 2001-2950, 2001 TNT 23-31. 22Their identities were disclosed during oral argument be-
fore the Seventh Circuit. See Kanter, supra note 4, 337 F.3d at 875. 
23Ballard, supra note 4, 321 F.3d at 1041. 
24Id. 
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vote of 3-0; the Eleventh Circuit by a 3-0 vote; and the 
Seventh Circuit by a vote of 2-1. The one was Judge 
Cudahy, who concurred in part and dissented in part. He 
agreed with the majority that Rule 183 does not require 
disclosure of an STJ' s original report; Rule 183 does not 
require the Tax Court to review an STJ' s initial findings 
under a "clearly erroneous" standard; Rule 183 is not 
violated "by a quasi-collaborative process of revision of 
an STJ' s report"; and no statute requires disclosure of an 
STJ's original report.2s 
Judge Cudahy also agreed with some of the majority's 
conclusions regarding due process. He said: 
along the full continuum of due process concerns 
framed by [Supreme Court precedents], there is no 
per se due process violation when the ultimate 
finder of fact reviews preliminary findings de nova. 
Therefore, I agree with the majority that the Fifth 
Amendment does not require that the Tax Court 
review STJ findings using any particular degree of 
deference. This means also that there is no consti-
tutional requirement that the Tax Court use an 
appellate-style review of its STJs' reports. In this 
respect, the quasi-collaborative model adopted by 
the Tax Court is permissible.26 
In the above respects, Judge Cudahy rejected the 
taxpayers' interpretation of cases that also feature promi-
nently in their briefs and in amid briefs submitted to the 
Supreme Court, cases such as Raddatz,27 Universal Cam-
era,28 and Mathews v. Eldridge.29 However, Judge Cudahy 
concluded that appellate review of the Tax Court's find-
ings could not be effective without access to the STJ's 
initial report. Judge Cudahy dissented on the ground that 
ineffective review violates due process.30 
C. Reactions 
Kanter, Ballard, and Lisle have sparked great interest. 
Many articles have been written on the cases.31 Although 
commentators are divided, most of them criticize the 
25Id., at 877-81 (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in ~art). 
6Id., at 882. 
27United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980). 
28Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). 
29424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
30Ballard, supra note 4, 337 F.3d at 884-888. 31 E.g., Randall G. Dick, "Further Thoughts on Tax Court 
Special Trial Judge Reports," Tax Notes, Feb. 26, 2001, p. 1253; 
Randall G. Dick, "When the Special Trial Judge Who Hears Your 
Case Does Not Decide It, What Are Your Options - If Any?" 4 
J. Tax Prac. and Proc. 19 (Dec. 2002/Jan. 2003); Cornish F. 
Hitchcock, "Public Access to Special Trial Judge Reports," Tax 
Notes, Oct. 15, 2001, p. 403; Gerald Kafka and Jonathan Acker-
man, "Fact-Finding in the Tax Court: Access to Special Trial 
Judge Reports," Tax Notes, Apr. 23, 2001, p. 639; Eric Winwood, 
"The Reclusive Report: The Tax Court Denies Due Process by 
Not Disclosing Special Trial Judge Reports to Litigants," 2004 
Fed. Cts L. Rev. 3. Mr. Dick is the attorney who submitted the 
affidavit describing alleged conversations with initially uniden-
tified Tax Court judges. 
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decisions. Many amicus briefs have been filed with the 
Supreme Court,32 again criticizing the decisions. 
All of the critics - whether the taxpayers, commen-
tators, or amici - support giving greater prominence to 
the original STJ's report (assuming there was one that 
differed from the report adopted as the Tax Court's 
decision). There are different forms that such greater 
prominence could take. The continuum, ranging from 
weakest to strongest form, includes at least these possi-
bilities: adding the original STJ's report to the record 
furnished the appellate courts, furnishing the original 
report to the parties during the Tax Court proceeding, 
furnishing the original report to the parties and permit-
ting them to file objections to it,33 and according a greater 
degree of formal deference to the STJ' s findings and 
recommendations, perhaps as high as "clearly errone-
ous" deference.34 
II. Policy of Not Going Behind Judicial Opinions 
If the Tax Court's decision in our cases were consistent 
with the views of the STJ, all or nearly all of the 
complaints against the decision evanesce. If the Tax 
Court's words are taken at face value, the decision is 
consistent with the STJ' s views. As noted in Part I, the Tax 
Court's December 15, 1999, decision stated, "The Court 
agrees with the opinion 'of the [STJ], which is set forth 
below," and the court's August 30, 2000, order - which 
was signed by the STJ, the judge, and the chief judge -
stated, "The underlying report adopted by the Tax Court 
is, in fact, [the STJ's] report." 
The taxpayers' position, therefore, requires going be-
hind or beyond the court's words. Doing so, however, 
would be distinctly undesirable. There is a strong tradi-
tion in our legal culture that courts speak through their 
issued opinions. Numerous times courts have held that 
the mental processes of judges and administrators cannot 
be inquired into or be made subject to discovery. The 
Supreme Court stated in the often cited decision of 
Fayerweather v. Rich: "A judgment is a solemn record. 
Parties have a right to rely upon it. It should not lightly 
be disturbed, and ought never to be overthrown or 
limited by the oral testimony of a judge ... of what he 
had in mind at the time of the decision."35 
The principle of not looking behind juridical acts is 
familiar from other contexts as well. For instance, "courts 
will not review the motives of a legislature in enacting a 
law";36 the thoughts of jurors and the processes by which 
32Amicus briefs have been filed, jointly or separately, by 
Public Citizen, the ACLU, the National Federation of Indepen-
dent Business Legal Foundation, Prof. Leandra Lederman, 
former Sen. David Pryor, and the Lisles. 33In effect, this would restore the pre-1984 version of current 
Rule 183. 34For example, the Kanter taxpayers argued to the Seventh 
Circuit "that the STJ's report cannot be rejected by the Tax Court 
unless [it is] clearly erroneous." Kanter, supra note 4, 337 F.3d at 
840. 35195 U.S. 276, 307 (1904); see also In re Cook, 49 F.3d 263, 265 
(7th Cir. 1995). 
36United States v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 1311, 1316 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(citing cases). 
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;~ey r~ach their v.erdicts typi~a~y ar~ beyo:r:d scrutiny;37 [t]he inner workings of administrative decision makin 
processes are almost never subject to discovery";3s and g 
statutory notice of deficiency represents the official d ~ 
termination of the IRS, and courts should not go behin~ 
the notice to examine the IRS's thought processes.39 
Of course, those rules are not infrangible. Exceptions 
exist in matters of overwhelming public importance 
such as invidious prejudice by the decisiorunaker(s) 
against a protected class of persons. But the reluctance of 
the courts to create those exceptions underscores the 
importance of the general principle. Moreover, the rule 
against looking behind judicial decisions is even stronger 
than the rules against looking behind other juridical 
acts.40 As one court stated: "The trial judge's statement of 
his mental process is so impervious to attack that even if 
he were to come forward today and declare that his 
memorandum misstated his reasons for [his decision], we 
could not consider his explanations."41 
That being so, the Supreme Court should accord no 
weight whatsoever to the affidavit, described in Part J.B., 
from one of the taxpayers' attorneys describing his 
alleged conversations with several Tax Court judges. On 
the strength of the principle just quoted, not even a 
postdecision statement from the STJ or the judge would 
be admissible to undercut the Tax Court's decision. 
Surely, then, alleged statements by other judges should 
not be. 
As courts have said in other contexts,42 the gain in 
occasional discovery of error that would result from 
going behind decisions would be outweighed by the 
harms, such as uncertainty, prolonged contention, and 
harassment of decisionmakers to explain, modify, or 
repudiate their decisions. 
Reflect for a moment on how an affidavit such as the 
one here could come about and what could happen in 
future cases were such affidavits admissible. Tax Court 
judges are selected from the ranks of private-sector and 
government tax attorneys, and they often maintain 
friendships with their former peers. A current judge 
might try to console a friend who had just lost a Tax 
Court case. The words of consolation might be infelici-
tously phrased or be misperceived by their hearer. More 
perniciously, a judge might use rumor and innuendo to 
attack another judge's decisions to make life difficult for 
a rival or disliked colleague on the bench. 
37E.g., Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120-121 (1987). 
38Goetz v. Crosson, 41 F.3d 800, 805 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied 
516 U.S. 821 (1995); see also United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 
422 (1941). 
39E.g., Greenberg's Express Inc. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 324, 
327-328 (1974). 
40E.g., Goetz, supra note 38, 41 F.3d at 805 ("Clearly, the inner 
workings of decision making by courts are kept in even greater 
confidence [than are decisional processes of administrative 
agencies]."). 
41Crouch, supra note 36, 566 F.2d at 1316. 
42E.g., Tanner, supra note 37, 483 U.S. at 120; McDonald & U.S. 
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-268 (1915)(both 
cases making this point in the context of jury verdicts). 
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•'e1 ;• I have no reason to believe that mis:placed s~pathy, 
•:?·· alice or any other unworthy motive explams the 
;; :f{ida~t here, and I cast no ~sper.sions o~ either the 
,1 wyer who authored the affidavit or his supposed 
..• ~urces. My point only is that those things could happen ~future cases were we to repudiate the sound principle 
gainst looking behind judicial decisions. That can of 
a should remain sealed. The potential for mischief, 
for disruption of orderly judicial process, is too great. 
. fu summary, complaints about this decision fail if the 
Tax Court's decision is consonant with the STJ's view of 
.the case. The Tax Court (including the STJ) has affirmed 
and reaffirmed that the decision is consonant with the 
sTJ's views. There the matter should end. The Supreme 
Court should use this case to reaffirm the sound principle 
that what appellate courts review are the decisions of 
trial courts, not the mental processes behind those deci-
sions. 
III. Deliberative Process 
Compared with some other trial courts, the Tax Court 
iS marked by a considerable degree of internal review, 
consultation, and deliberation. For example, the chief 
judge reviews judges' reports, and reports may be circu-
lated and discussed as part of a full-court consideration.43 
Under Rule 183, there also may be consultation and 
discussion between the STJ assigned to hear a case and 
the judge assigned to decide it. That will not happen 
while the STJ is preparing his original report because, 
1,l11der Rule 183(b), that report is submitted to the chief 
·judge before the chief judge assigns the case to a judge for 
decision. Discussion may occur, however, after the case 
has been assigned to the judge as he considers, under 
Rule 183(c), whether to adopt, modify, or reject in whole 
or in part the STJ's proposed findings and opinion. 
Judge Cudahy recognized that possibility and was 
-- troubled by it. He feared that, because of unequal status, 
the judge could overbear the STJ's convictions, causing 
the STJ to "revise" his opinion to conform to the judge's 
views.44 The judge would then "adopt" what was in 
name, though not in truth, the new STJ's report. Judge 
Cudahy wrote: 
What Kanter alleges happened in the present case, 
and what commonly occurs in the Tax Court, is that 
a Tax Court judge takes the STJ's report ... and 
works together with the STJ to edit it. From this 
process emerges a final report that may or may not 
bear any resemblance to the original report, but that 
still may be called the STJ' s "opinion" (but not the 
STJ's "report") if the STJ agrees to subscribe to it. 
This modified report is then "adopted" by the Tax 
Court judge and filed as the Tax Court "opinion." 
* * * 
43See section 7460(b). 
44But cf Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675, 678-681 (2d Cir. 1989), 
c~rt: denied 493 U.S. 812 (1989)(rejecting arguments by adminis-
trative law judges (ALJ) that review procedures established by 
the secretary of Health and Human Services compromised the 
decisional independence of the ALJs _in Social Security cases). 
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I believe that the record supports the notion that the 
Tax Court engages in a quasi-collaborative process 
of review of the STJ's report from which a new and 
frequently different STJ's opinion emerges to be 
adopted and agreed with by the Tax Court.45 
I do not know if that description is correct at the level 
of fact. Assume arguendo that it is. I do not find the 
possibility of collaboration between the judge and the STJ 
either distressing or sinister. I think it's good. From a 
collaborative, consultative process, better decisions pre-
sumably will emerge. If the judge asks the STJ, "About 
this part of your opinion, did you consider X? And what 
about Y and Z?," the resultant intellectual thrusts and 
parries are more likely to help than to hurt the quality of 
decisionmaking.46 
Both the Eleventh Circuit and the Seventh Circuit 
underlined the importance of the deliberative process 
value.47 The Eleventh Circuit said: 
While the procedures used in the Tax Court may be 
unique to that court, there is nothing unusual about 
judges conferring with one another about cases 
assigned to them. . . . And, as a result of such 
conferences, judges sometimes change their origi-
nal position or thoughts. Whether [the STJ] pre-
pared drafts of his report or subsequently changed 
his mind entirely is without import insofar as our 
analysis of the alleged due process violation ... is 
concerned. Despite the invitation, this court will 
simply not interfere with another court's delibera-
tive process.48 
The Seventh Circuit agreed, saying: 
If ... Rule 183 in fact provides the opportunity for 
STJs and Tax Court judges to conference regarding 
the STJ's preliminary findings, then we have every 
reason to believe that Tax Court judges would duly 
regard the input of the STJ and that he, in turn, 
would participate meaningfully in the exchange. 
Like [other circuits], we too are loath to interfere 
with another court's deliberative process.49 
IV. Due Process 
A. Generally 
An important part of the complaints against Rule 183 
is that the relationship it establishes between the hearing 
magistrate (the STJ) and the deciding magistrate (the 
45Kanter, supra note 4, 337 F.2d at 876 (Cudahy, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
46For further discussion of the deliberative process value as 
it bears on Kanter/ Ballard, see Allen D. Madison, "Revisiting 
Access to the Tax Court's Deliberative Process," Tax Notes, May 
10, 2004, p. 749; Allen D. Madison, "Access to the Tax Court's 
Deliberative Processes," Tax Notes, June 25, 2001, p. 2247. 
47By incorporation, the Fifth Circuit may have done so as 
well. See Lisle, supra note 4, 341 F.3d at 384 (saying, in its due 
process analysis: "We find the reasoning of the Seventh and 
Eleventh Circuits direct and persuasive, and adopt it here."). 
48Ballard, supra note 4, 321 F.3d at 1042-1043. 
49Kanter, supra note 4, 337 F.3d at 844. 
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judge) is rmusual, indeed rmique, in federal practice.so In 
other contexts - such as a magistrate judge relative to a 
district court judge or an administrative law judge rela-
tive to an agency secretary or commissioner - the report 
of the hearing officer is, pursuant to statute or rule, given 
"clearly erroneous" review by the deciding officer or, at 
least, is included in the record received by the appellate 
court reviewing the trial tribrmal's decision.s1 
Accept arguendo that the relationship created by cur-
rent Rule 183(b) is rmique in federal practice.s2 I do not 
think that matters. The courts have repeatedly held that 
due process' is a flexible concept, one that depends on 
context and does not command that all tribrmals' pro-
cesses be identica1.s3 Quite rightly, courts are reluctant to 
invalidate the rules of other courts. Due process is not so 
rigid that the procedures of different tribrmals must be 
wrenched or whittled onto a Procrustean bed. 
The taxpayers argue to the contrary (at least in part), 
relying on a line of cases represented most recently by the 
Supreme Court's Oberg decision.s4 They maintain, rmder 
Oberg, that "material departure from well-established 
and traditional judicial procedures creates a presumptive 
due process violation."ss To be sure, there are words in 
Oberg that can be used to support the taxpayers' conten-
tion. But words in a judicial opinion cannot be divorced 
from context.s6 Understood contextually, Oberg does not 
carry the taxpayers very far. 
In Oberg the Supreme Court held that due process was 
violated by a state rule (added to the state constitution by 
direct vote of the people)s7 that severely limited judicial 
sosee, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Public Citizen Inc., and the 
American Civil Liberties Union, Kanter v. Commissioner, No. 
03-1034, at 5-13. 
51 See, e.g., Kanter, supra note 4, 337 F.3d at 874-875. 52 At some stages of this litigation, the government has 
argued that memoranda prepared by a judge's law clerk are 
internal deliberative documents privileged against disclosure. 
Part of the debate in Kanter/Ballard involves whether an STJ's 
original report is better likened to a law clerk's memorandum or 
to a recommended decision penned by a district court magis-
trate judge or by an ALJ. 
53E.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("due 
process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as 
the particular situation demands"); Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 
367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)("Due Process, unlike some legal rules, is 
not a technical conception with a fixed context unrelated to 
time, place and circumstances."). 
s4Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994). 
ssraxpayers' Brief on the Merits on Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, Ballard v. Commissioner, No. 03-184, at 44. 56
"Particularly in dealing with claims under broad provi-
sions of the Constitution, which derive context by an interpre-
tive process of inclusion and exclusion, it is imperative that 
generalizations, based on and qualified by the concrete situa-
tions that gave rise to them, must not be applied out of context 
in disregard of variant controlling facts." Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 
364 U.S. 339, 343-344 (1960); see also Northern Nat'l Bank v. Porter 
Township, 110 U.S. 608, 615 (1884)(noting, quoting prior cases, 
that it is "a maxim not to be disregarded that general expres-
sions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the 
case in which those expressions are used"). 
s7Courts have struggled with the proper role of judicial 
review of constitutional referenda and initiatives. See, e.g., Steve 
(Footnote continued in next column.) 
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review of prmitive damage awards by juries. The Su-
preme Court reasoned that the Constitution imposes 
substantive limits on the size of prmitive damages 
awards; that judicial review was an important safeguard 
under the common law against excessive awards; and 
that the state's deprivation of that well-established 
common-law protection violated due process because the 
state's remaining procedures afforded insufficient protec-
tion against excessive awards. 
In context, Oberg is readily distinguishable from 
Kanter/Ballard. First, Oberg's core issue - the concern 
about rrmaway juries imposing astronomical prmitive 
damages - was significant. Many courts and commen-
tators have given voice to this concem,ss and Oberg 
clearly was animated by it. The Court said: 
Prmitive damages pose an acute danger of arbitrary 
deprivation of property. Jury instructions typically 
leave the jury with wide discretion in choosing 
amormts, and the preservation of evidence of a 
defendant's net worth creates the potential that 
juries will use their verdicts to express biases 
against big businesses, particularly those without 
strong local presences. Judicial review of the 
amount awarded was one of the few procedural 
safeguards against that danger.s9 
Second, Oberg reaffirmed that flexibility, not rigidity, 
characterizes due process analysis. The Court stated: "Of 
course, not all deviations from established procedures 
result in constitutional infirmity. As the Court noted in 
Hurtado, to hold all procedural change rmconstitutional 
'would be to deny every quality of the law but its age, 
and to render it incapable of progress or improve-
ment."'60 The Court distinguished Hurtado by noting 
that, in that case, "examination by a neutral magistrate 
provided criminal defendants with nearly the same pro-
tection as the abrogated common-law grand jury proce-
dure."61 
In cases such as Kanter and Ballard, a neutral magis-
trate, the judge, is empowered and directed by statute 
and rule to render decision on behalf of the Tax Court, 
subject to the court's established procedures. Oberg in-
voked legal tradition to require judicial review of jury 
awards of punitive damages when other controls were 
nonexistent or weak. It is a stretch to say that Oberg 
establishes a presumption against the constitutionality of 
a court's internal review procedures when they differ 
from other forums' internal review procedures. The 
stretch is greater than elasticity will bear given that Oberg 
reaffirmed the constitutional permissibility of procedural 
variations. 
R. Johnson, "Supermajority Provisions, Guinn v. Legislature and 
a Flawed Constitutional Structure," 4 Nev. L.J. 491, 502-506 and 
nn. 81, 96 (2004)(citing authorities). 
s8For example, in Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 
1 (1991), a majority of the justices agreed that the Due Process 
Clause imposes limits on punitive damages awards. 
590berg, supra note 54, 512 U.S. at 432. 
60Id. at 430-31 (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 529 
(1884)). 61512 U.S. at 431. 
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B. Eldridge Factors 
The taxpayers62 invoke the three-factor analysis of-
fered in Mathews v. Eldridge63 and repeated in United 
States v. Raddatz. 64 Those factors are: the private interest at 
stake, the risk of an erroneous determination under the 
procedures in question, and "the public interest and 
administrative burdens, including costs that the addi-
tional procedures would involve."65 Far from calling it 
into question, those cases confirm the constitutionality of 
Rule 183. 
Again, context matters. In Eldridge a recipient whose 
Social Security disability benefits had been terminated 
challenged the termination on due process grounds. The 
district court and the circuit court agreed with the 
recipient. The Supreme Court reversed, upholding the 
constitutionality of Social Security Administration proce-
dures. The Court held that due process does not require 
an evidentiary hearing before termination of Social Secu-
rity benefits. 
In so doing, the Court distinguished its earlier deci-
sion in Goldberg v. Kelly,66 which had found a due process 
right to an evidentiary hearing before termination of 
welfare benefits. Eldridge is widely and rightly under-
stood as a retrenchment.67 By limiting Goldberg, it put the 
brakes on an incipient due process revolution that some 
had thought would sweep through administrative proce-
dure. In that light, the taxpayers' reliance on Eldridge is 
antihistorical and anticontextual. Eldridge was a shield 
meant to protect agency processes from rigid constitu-
tionalization. The taxpayers would convert that case into 
a sword with which to attack court processes tailored to 
the particular tribunal's nature and needs. 
Even if we view the Eldridge formulation abstractly, 
divorced from its history and context, it still would not 
suggest due process infirmity in Rule 183. We consider 
the three Eldridge factors below. 
1. Private interest at stake. Consider this factor in rela-
tion to Raddatz, a 1980 case that invoked the tripartite 
- Eldridge formulation. The defendant had been convicted 
of violating a federal statute prohibiting receipt of a 
firearm through interstate commerce by a convicted 
felon. On appeal, the defendant alleged due process 
violation. Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress 
incriminating statements he had made to police officers. 
The district court referred the motion to a magistrate 
judge for an evidentiary hearing, after which the court 
ruled on the motion based on the record developed at the 
hearing and the magistrate's proposed findings of fact 
and recommendation.6B 
62See Taxpayers' Brief on the Merits on Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, Ballard v. Commissioner, No. 03-184, at 47-48. 
63424 U.S. 319 (1976). 64447 U.S. 667 (1980). 
65424 U.S. at 335. 
66397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
67See, e.g., William F. Fox Jr., Understanding Administrative Law 
151-154 (3d. ed. 1997). 
68These procedures were set out in the Federal Magistrates 
Act, 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(l). The act allows the district court 
to make de nova determination as to those portions of the 
magistrate's report to which a party objects, and it allows the 
(Footnote continued in next column.) 
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The district court accepted the magistrate judge's 
proposed findings of fact and recommendations, and it 
denied the suppression motion. The circuit court re-
versed, holding that the defendant was denied due 
process because the district court judge failed personally 
to hear the controverted testimony on the motion to 
suppress. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court. 
The Court held that the district court was not constitu-
tionally required to rehear the testimony to make an 
independent evaluation of witness demeanor or credibil-
ity. 69 
In addressing the first Eldridge factor (the private 
interest at stake), the Supreme Court noted that, as a 
practical matter, resolution of a suppression motion often 
determines whether the defendant will be convicted or 
acquitted. Nonetheless, the Court held, the interests at 
stake in a suppression hearing are lower than in the 
criminal trial itself.70 
The interests at stake in a Tax Court trial - always 
civil - are lower than those at stake in criminal trials. 
They also are lower than those at stake in cases like 
Goldberg and Eldridge. Receipt of welfare or (perhaps) 
Social Security payments may be critical to one's eco-
nomic security, even survival. Although millions of dol-
lars of tax liability were at stake in Kanter, Ballard, and 
related cases, those liabilities are unlikely to rise to the 
level of imperiling the taxpayers' economic survival, 
especially given the existence of options such as offers in 
compromise and bankruptcy. Undeniably, the private 
interests in our cases are important, but they do not rise 
to the levels of Goldberg (where a due process challenge 
succeeded) or of Raddatz and Eldridge (where due process 
challenges failed). 
As a postscript, consider another use taxpayers would 
make of Raddatz. The Court remarked in passing: "The 
issue is not before us, but we assume it is unlikely that a 
district judge would reject a magistrate's proposed find-
ings on credibility when those findings are dispositive 
and substitute the judge's own appraisal; to do so with-
out seeing and hearing the witness ... whose credibility 
is in question could well give rise to serious questions 
which we do not reach."71 
That statement does. not control our cases. It was 
dictum, as the Court's own words reveal, and questions 
that are "serious" in a criminal context may be less so in 
a civil context. Moreover, the predicate condition, that 
observing the witness generated findings that are "dis-
positive," is absent in our cases. That is because of the 
distinction between demeanor and credibility. That dis-
tinction is developed in the discussion immediately be-
low. 
district court to accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the 
magistrate judge's findings and recommendations. The act also 
allows the district court to receive further evidence or to 
recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. 
Id. 
69447 U.S. at 677-680. 
70Id., at 677-681. 
71Id., at 681 n.7 (emphasis in original). 
1241 
COMMENTARY I SPECIAL REPORT 
2. Risk of error. The taxpayers stress that the STJ was the 
magistrate who heard and saw the witnesses as they 
testified at trial. Important to their position is a conten-
tion along the following lines: "These are fraud cases. The 
ultimate issue as to fraud involves the taxpayers' state of 
mind or intention.72 Thus, it is particularly important to 
evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, especially the 
taxpayers. When a taxpayer is on the stand testifying as 
to what he knew or intended, the court must evaluate the 
taxpayer's credibility. The magistrate who presided over 
the trial, who had the opportunity to observe the wit-
nesses as they testified, is uniquely able to make those 
vital credibility determinations."73 
There is something to that contention, but much less 
than critics of the Tax Court's and circuit courts' decisions 
might wish. That contention conflates demeanor and 
credibility. Demeanor is the witness's behavior on the 
stand. Did she make eye contact? Did she squirm or 
perspire profusely? How long did she pause before 
answering? What was her tone? The hearing officer is in 
a better position to assess those things. But demeanor is 
only one of the many factors that feed into the credibility 
determination, and often it is not the most important of 
those factors. 
The Supreme Court'~ decision in Anderson v. Bessemer 
City74 is significant in that regard. The Court reaffirmed 
that a trial court's findings of fact are not to be over-
turned on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. The 
Court gave "opportunity to observe the witnesses" as 
one rationale, but it did not rest the rule simply on that 
basis. The Court said that deference is required /1 even 
when the ... court's findings do not rest on credibility 
determinations, but are based instead on physical or 
documentary evidence or inferences from other facts."75 
The Court expressly rejected lower court decisions that 
no deference is due when the trial court's findings are not 
based on credibility judgments. The Court held: 
The rationale for deference ... is not limited to the 
superiority of the trial judge's position to make 
determinations on credibility. . . . [F]actors other 
than demeanor and inflection go into the decision 
whether or not to believe a witness. Documents or 
objective evidence may contradict the witness' 
story; or the story itself may be so internally 
inconsistent or implausible on its face that a rea-
sonable factfinder would not credit it.76 
The testimony of even a witness whose demeanor is 
smooth, polished, and apparently sincere may be found 
not credible if his story is contradicted by the objective 
facts and by the relevant documents. The Tax Court's 
determinations of fraud against Kanter, Ballard, and Lisle 
72E.g., Switzer v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 759, 765 (1953). 73For argument along these lines, see, e.g., Taxpayers' Brief 
on the Merits on Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ballard v. 
Commissioner, No. 03-184, at 40-41. 
74470 U.S. 564 (1985). 
75Id., at 574. 
76Id., at 574-575. 
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rested overwhelmingly on the objective facts d 
documents, not on "trust me; I was there" assess: the 
demeanor. nts of 
The Tax Court's fraud determinations rest d 
broadly similar rationales for each of the three t e on 
ers.77 They included: axpay-
(1) Training and experience of the taxpayers. Th 
h 1 b . d . ose ave ong een recogruze as pertinent to the fra d 
inquiry.7B Ballard and Lisle were both sophisticatud 
and experienced businessmen. The former had he~d 
high executive positions at Prudential and Gold-
man Sachs; the latter had held high executiv 
positions at Prudential and Travelers. Kanter ha~ 
been a practicing tax attorney for over 30 years. He 
had taught tax courses at the University of Chicago 
Law Schoo.l, had written and published extensively 
on tax topics, and was a nationally prominent tax 
expert. 
(2) Consistent and substantial understatements of 
income. Those conditions are strong evidence of 
fraud.79 Each of the taxpayers had unreported 
income for over a decade, totaling several million 
dollars for each. 
(3) Engaging in complex series of arrangements to 
conceal the true nature of the income and the 
identities of those who earned or received it. The 
taxpayers' arrangements included commingling 
funds, using sham entities, creating elaborate 
money flows, and putting money or property in the 
names of nominees. Those devices are indicative of 
fraud.BO 
(4) Impeding the IRS's investigation. In varying 
degrees, the taxpayers withheld relevant docu-
ments, destroyed records, tried to put records be-
yond the reach of the IRS, and made false and 
misleading statements to IRS agents. Those actions 
are evidence of fraud.BI 
The Tax Court's opinion mentioned witness credibility 
only rarely. For instance, it stated: "Kanter' s testimony at 
trial was implausible, unreliable, and sometimes contra-
dictory. We did not find it credible."B2 Again, referring to 
three witnesses (not Ballard, Kanter, and Lisle), the court 
said: "The testimony of [the witnesses] is not credible. 
They performed no services for [one of the sham entities]. 
The payments to them were from funds Ballard and Lisle 
earned from the Prudential transactions."83 
Those occasional credibility assessments do not under-
mine my argument. The credibility assessments do not 
appear to depend on demeanor. Their phrasing sugges'.s 
that the court disbelieved the witnesses because their 
77The summary in the text is drawn from 1999 TNT 241-4 
paras. 602-643. 
7BE.g., Iletj v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 631, 635 (1952). 
79E.g., Marcus v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 562, 577 (1978), aff d 
without published opinion 621 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1980). . ) 
B0E.g., United States v. Peterson, 338 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1964 · 
BI E.g., Estate of Beck v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 297 (1971). 
B21999 TNT 241-4 para. 639. 
83Id. para. 590. 
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sertions contradicted the established facts and docu-
·5 ents, not because of the witnesses' verbal inflections or 
onverbal signals. One does not have to hear the wit-
~esses '~live" to ~onclude that th~ir testimon)'." "wa~ 
iJnplaus1ble, unreliable, and sometimes contradictory. 
'[hose conclusions can easily emerge from comparing the 
transcribed testimony to the facts established by the 
: documents, by stipulation, or otherwise. 
· ····: Th!~e additional points. First, I realize that I am 
attacking a cow sacred to some. Many judges and com-
mentators have remarked on the trial magistrate's oppor-
tunity to observe the witnesses; some have almost rhap-
sodized about it.84 I must confess that I have long 
suspected that the benefit of that opportunity has been 
exaggerated. 
In my own life, subsequent events have made it 
painfully clear that I often have believed smooth liars and 
disbelieved bumbling truth-tellers. I hope that our trial 
judges have a higher batting average than mine, but I'm 
not entirely sure they do. A recent report by a psychology 
professor presented at an American Medical Association 
conference, although it studied laypersons rather than 
judges, fortifies my concern. The report found that the 
"vast majority" of people fail to detect the "flickers of 
falsehood" of liars. Of 13,000 people tested, "we found 
31, who we call wizards, who are usually able to tell 
whether the person is lying."85 
Second, the Supreme Court remarked in the Morgan 
case that "the one who decides must hear."86 But sweep-
ing statements typically require refinement, certainly in 
an area like due process. Morgan involved a Fair Labor 
Standards Act determination, and the Court did not 
require that the secretary of labor (who had ultimate 
responsibility for making the determination) actually 
preside at the hearing. Recognizing that, subsequent 
courts have held that the broad Morgan language "is used 
in the artistic sense of requiring certain procedural 
minima to insure an informed judgment by the one who 
has [final decisional] responsibility."87 Those minima 
were satisfied in our cases because the judge had avail-
able to him the voluminous transcript, stipulations, and 
documentary exhibits as well as the STJ' s findings and 
recommendations. 
Third, analogous lines of cases support the constitu-
tionality of Rule 183. There are times when the decision 
for the Tax Court is rendered by a judge other than the 
judge who presided over the hearing. That happens 
84s ee, e.g., Queen v. Bertrand, 4 Moo. P.C.N.S. 460, 481, 16 Eng. 
Re]J. 391, 399 (1867). 85Prof. Maureen O'Sullivan, quoted in "Truth 'Wizards' Foil 
Liars," Las Vegas Review-Journal, Oct. 15, 2004, p. 7 A (Associated 
Press report). The emphasis on "usually" is mine, to note that 
even those few, exceptional people sometimes fail in their 
demeanor evaluations. 
86Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 481 (1936). 
87Southern Garment Mfrs. Ass'n Inc. v. Fleming, 122 F.2d 622, 
626 (D.C. Cir. 1941); see also Estate of Varian v. Commissioner, 396 
F.2d 753, 755 (9th Cir. 1968)(the Morgan language "means simply 
that the officer who makes the findings must have considered 
the evidence or arguments"). 
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when the presiding judge resigned,88 retired,89 or died90 
after the hearing but before decision. It also happens by 
statute. When the presiding judge submits her report, the 
chief judge is empowered to direct that the case be 
reviewed by the full court. When that happens, section 
7 460(b) prescribes that the presiding judge's repqrt "shall 
not be a part of the record in [the] case."91 
Disappointed taxpayers have raised due process chal-
lenges to the decisions in many such cases. Those chal-
lenges have uniformly been rejected by the courts, in-
cluding in fraud cases92 and often in strong language.93 
The cited cases establish that it is not error for a nonpre-
siding judge to render a decision for the court; the 
presiding judge's view (if contrary to the deciding 
judge's view) need not receive "clearly erroneous" def-
erence; and the presiding judge's report need not be 
included in the record. 
One might rejoin that, in section 7460(b) cases, the 
presiding judge has the chance to write a dissenting 
opinion, so the appellate court may become aware of that 
judge's view of the case. However, that opportunity does 
not exist in the resignation, retirement, and death cases, a 
fact that does not alter the result. 
In summary, demeanor is only a part of the larger 
issue of credibility. As the Supreme Court taught in 
Anderson, a trial court's factual findings can rest on 
objective factors independent of witness demeanor and 
those findings are entitled to deference on appeal even if 
based on those factors rather than on demeanor. That 
describes Kanter, Ballard, and related cases. The Tax 
Court's findings of fraud were not demeanor-dependent. 
The objective facts were discernable by the judge from 
the record, and they were reviewable by the circuit courts 
from the record. 
3. Burdens from additional procedures. For the preced-
ing reasons, the benefits from altering Rule 183 would be 
small, either by commanding additional deference by the. 
judge to the STJ' s conclusions or by adding the STJ' s 
original report to the appellate record. There would, 
though, be costs. Depending on which change were 
made, there might be a decrease of the Tax Court's 
efficiency in case disposition.94 Moreover, according the 
original STJ' s report greater prominence in the trial or 
88E.g., Towers v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 233, 234 (2d Cir. 1957), 
cert. denied 355 U.S. 914 (1958). 
89E.g., Seaside Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 105 F.2d 990 
(2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied 308 U.S. 618 (1939). 
90E.g., Amoroso v. Commissioner, 193 F.2d 583, 586 (1st Cir. 
1952), cert. denied 343 U.S. 926 (1952). 
91See, e.g., Estate of Varian v. Commissioner, 396 F.2d 753, 
754-755 (9th Cir. 1968); Heim v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 44, 47-48 
(8th Cir. 1958); Powell v. Commissioner, 94 F.2d 483, 486 (1st Cir. 
1938). 
92E.g., Halle v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 500, 503-504 (2d Cir. 
1949), cert. denied 338 U.S. 949 (1950). 
93E.g., Towers, supra note 88, 247 F.2d at 234 ("the contention 
that the petitioners were deprived of procedural due process is 
utterly without merit"). 
94See Allen D. Madison, "Revisiting Access to the Tax Court's 
Deliberative Process," Tax Notes, May 10, 2004, p. 749 at 751 
("because of the large volume of cases heard using the Rule 183 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
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appellate process could undercut the affirmative values 
developed in Parts II and III above. Under sections 
7443A, 7459, and 7460, the decision through which the 
Tax Court speaks is the decision of the judge, not of the 
STJ. In addition, formalizing or freezing the STJ's report 
in its original form could inhibit intellectual give-and-
take between the STJ and the judge, to the detriment of 
the court's internal deliberative process. 
C. Effective Appellate Review 
As noted in Part LB., all nine circuit court judges 
rejected the due process arguments discussed thus far. 
Judge Cudahy dissented because of a different due 
process concern: That the absence of the STJ's original 
report from the record precluded effective judicial re-
view. However, that concern too is misplaced. 
At the outset, it is important to understand what the 
appellate court reviews. What is reviewed is the decision 
of the Tax Court,95 and that decision is rendered by the 
judge, not by the STJ. Congress said that in sections 
7443A and 7460, and the Supreme Court confirmed it in 
Freytag.96 Therefore, the question is not "did the Tax 
Court's opinion adequately account for the STJ's findings 
and recommendations?" Instead, the question is "does 
the Tax Court's opinion, standing on its own, adequately 
justify the holding(s) the Tax Court reached?" 
In those terms, the Tax Court's opinion was review-
able, effectively reviewable, even as to the fraud deter-
minations. As pointed out in Part N.B.2., those determi-
nations rested on objective facts developed from an 
abundant trial record. The circuit courts had that record 
and were fully able to assess whether the Tax Court's 
factual findings were supported by the record and 
whether, as a matter of law, those findings formed a 
sufficient basis for imposition of fraud penalties. That 
assessment did not have to juggle ambiguities regarding 
demeanor because demeanor played a minor role at best 
in the Tax Court's decision. 
An appellate court that found either that the Tax 
Court's findings were unsupported by the record or that 
the properly found facts did not establish fraud under the 
law, had the opportunity, indeed the duty, to reverse. It is 
noteworthy that one of the circuit courts did that in part: 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed in Lisle as to the deficiencies 
but reversed regarding the fraud penalties.97 
V. Statutory Arguments 
As our cases worked their way through the judicial 
process, taxpayers and others argued that the Tax Court's 
application of Rule 183 is inconsistent with the rule itself, 
with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, or with 
process, imposing on the Tax Court an extra review process 
could have a serious effect on the caseload of the Tax Court"). 
95See section 7482(a)(the circuit courts have "jurisdiction to 
review the decision of the Tax Court"). 
96Freijtag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 875 n.3 (1991)(An STJ 
"has no authority to decide a case" in the category to which our 
cases belong). 
97See Lisle, supra note 4, 341 F.3d at 375-383. 
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code sec~ons go:rerning the . Tax Court.9B Those argu-
ments failed to fmd favor with any of the nine circuit 
court judges. The Rule 183 argument is very much an 
uphill fight given the settled principle that a court's 
interpretation of its own rules is accorded "a great deal of 
deference."99 The statutory arguments depend, in the 
main, on misconstruing "decision," "report," and other 
terms in the sections.100 
Moreover, arguments for heightened deference to STJ 
findings exist in uneasy relation to the direction of 
sections 7443A(c) and 7460(b) that the decision of the Tax 
Court is rendered by the judge, not the STJ. For instance 
assume that "clearly erroneous" deference were accorded 
to the STJ findings and that, in a particular case, the judge 
assigned to decide the case had a 51 percent conviction 
that the STJ's view was wrong. On a de nova standard, the 
judge would reject the STJ's findings. On a "clearly 
erroneous" standard, though, the judge would have to 
accept those findings. Because of deference, the STJ's 
view would prevail. In effect, the STJ would be rendering 
the decision on behalf of the court despite the statutes' 
direction that the judge render that decision. 
I want to address in greater detail two arguments: 
those involving section 7482 and the policy of transpar-
ency. Those have been advanced by Leandra Lederman 101 
as well as others. Prof. Lederman's is an important voice 
in tax procedure, and her views deserve respectful con-
sideration. 
A. Section 7482 
Section 7482(a) was enacted in 1948. It provides in 
relevant part that the circuit courts "shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Tax Court ... in 
the same manner and to the same extent as decisions of 
the district court in civil actions tried without a jury." 
Prof. Lederman argues: "The Tax Court's current practice 
of keeping the reports of [STJs] in Rule 183 cases out of 
the record on appeal violates this statute because it 
renders the [circuit courts] incapable of reviewing Tax 
Court decisions 'to the same extent' as bench trials in the 
district courts. "102 
But statutes must be interpreted in light of their 
purposes,103 and section 7482(a) is no exception. Because 
of the persons appointed to it and its specialized docket, 
the Tax Court possesses greater tax expertise than any 
other federal court. Accordingly, the idea sometimes has 
been voiced that Tax Court decisions should receive 
98See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae National Federation of 
Independent Business Legal Foundation, Ballard v. Commissioner 
and Kanter v. Commissioner, Nos. 03-184 and 03-1034, at 19-20 
(ar~ents under sections 7459 and 7461). 
9Kanter, supra note 4, 337 F.3d at 878 (Cudahy, J., concurring 
in ~art and dissenting in part). 
00see, e.g., id. at 842-43. . 
101Brief of Amicus Curiae Prof. Leandra Lederman, Ballard v. 
Commissioner and Kanter v. Commissioner, Nos. 03-184 and 03-
1034 (hereafter Lederman Brief); Leandra Lederman, "Transpar-
ency and Obfuscation in Tax Court Procedure," Tax Notes, Mar. 
22, 2004, p. 1539 (hereafter Lederman Article). 102Lederman Brief, supra note 101, at 1-2. 
103E.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 
(1983). 
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greater deference than those of other tax trial tribunals. 
The high-water mark of that was the Supreme Court's 
1943 Dobson decision.104 
That aspect of Dobson provoked strong opposition. It is 
clear that a main purpose of the 1948 legislation was to 
overturn that aspect of Dobson.105 Prof. Lederman 
agrees.106 Uncertainty clouds much else about the 1948 
legislation and Congress's intentions as to it, as is shown 
by the painstaking work of Prof. David Shores, who has 
offered the most comprehensive history of the 1948 
legislation.107 Nonetheless, the anti-Dobson purpose was 
clear. 
In this respect, section 7482(a) was a command di-
rected to the appellate courts, a command to cease 
extraordinary deference to the Tax Court. It was not a 
command to the Tax Court to structure its internal 
processes (as to S1Js or anything else) along any particu-
lar lines. The circuit courts were told how to deal with 
decisions reaching them from the Tax Court. The Tax 
Court was not told by what processes it is to reach its 
decisions. 
Section 7482(a) should be given effect in terms of its 
purpose as to the appellate courts. It should not be 
converted into a device to change a trial court. My 
argument draws strength from three Supreme Court 
administrative law decisions in the last decade. In 
MCI,108 Brown & Williamson,109 and ATA,110 the Court 
rejected attempts by agencies to change established juris-
diction or rules based on thin statutory language unsup-
ported by demonstrated congressional intent. "Each of 
these cases stands for the proposition that Congress does 
not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme 
in vague or ancillary provisions."111 Similarly, statutory 
language directed at appellate courts should not be the 
basis for backdoor change of a trial court. 
B. Transparency 
Many critics of the decisions in our cases complain 
that Rule 183 is applied in a secretive manner inconsis-
tent with what they perceive to be a general policy of 
104Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 498-507 (1943). 105For some of the history, see Steve R. Johnson, "The 
Phoenix and the Perils of the Second Best: Why Heightened 
Appellate Deference to Tax Court Decisions Is Undesirable," 77 
Or. L. Rev. 235, 247-253 (1998). 106Lederman Brief, supra note 101, at 9 (section 7482(a)(l) 
"was enacted in 1948 to overturn the holding in Dabs.on"). 
107See David F. Shores, "Deferential Review of Tax Court 
Decisions: Dobson Revisited," 49 Tax Law. 629 (1996). 108MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & 
Telegraph Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994) (rejecting a Federal Commu-
nications Commission attempt to modify tariff filing by long-
distance carriers). 
109FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 529 U.S. 120 
(2000)(rejecting a Federal Drug Administration attempt to regu-
late tobacco as a drug). 
110Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns Inc., 531 U.S. 457 
(2001) (rejecting an Environmental Protection Agency attempt to 
modify national air quality standards because of implementa-
tion costs). 
111New York State Bar Ass'n v. FTC, 276 F. Supp.2d 110, 127 
(D.D.C. 2003). 
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transparency in court and administrative processes.112 
Judge Cudahy put it this way: "Transparency is the 
universal practice of agencies and courts employing 
these decisional practices. The question then becomes, if 
there are policy reasons that dictate transparency for 
everyone else, why do these reasons not apply to the Tax 
Court?"113 
One is tempted to respond to the question by invoking 
aspects of the affirmative case described earlier, but there 
are anterior responses to the transparency argument. 
First, the question posed by Judge Cudahy is a question 
for Congress, not for the courts. It would be illegitimate 
for a court to say, "We can discern no reason why the Tax 
Court should be different. Therefore, we will order the 
Tax Court to conform its procedures to the procedures of 
other courts and of agencies." That would be judicial 
legislation. The Tax Court is an Article I court, thus a 
creature of Congress. Transparency is a policy argument. 
Congress can change Tax Court procedures based on a 
policy argument. The courts should not. If, contrary to 
my view, the Supreme Court concludes that Rule 183's 
application violates the Constitution or present statutes, 
the Court can and should invalidate that rule. But the 
Court should not take that action based on a policy 
argument alone. 
Second, viewed through a wider lens, transparency is 
hardly a universal principle of our courts. Among other 
examples, initial drafts of Supreme Court and other 
courts' opinions are not published or disclosed; law 
clerks' memoranda to their judges and notes between 
judges are privileged; predecisional communications 
among officials of agencies are often shielded by the 
governmental deliberative privilege;114 and as previously 
noted, section 7460(b) provides that an initial report by 
the assigned judge is omitted from the record on appeal 
in cases subject to full-court review. In short, while love 
may conquer all, transparency does not, at least not in 
our judicial process. 
Transparency has great "sound bite" appeal. Oppos-
ing that rhetoric is like impugning motherhood, apple 
pie, and the flag. But slogans should not displace sober 
analysis of institutional roles and structures, and policies 
are subject to constraints.115 
C. Possible Legislative Change 
Prof. Lederman discusses the possibility of Congress 
enacting legislation to alter Rule 183, and she identifies a 
candidate vehicle for legislation.116 Efforts along those 
lines are being attempted although it is too early to assess 
the prospects for their success. 
112E.g., Lederman Brief, supra note 101, at 22-26; Lederman 
Article, supra note 101, at 1542-1544. 
113Kanter, supra note 4, 337 F.3d at 874 (Cudahy, J., concurring 
in ~art and dissenting in part). 
14E.g., United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 792, 
798-799 (1984). 115Cf Frank Easterbrook, "Statutes' Domains," 50 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 533, 541 (1983)("No matter how good the end in view, 
achievement of that end will have some cost, and at some point 
the cost will begin to exceed the benefits."). 116Lederman Article, supra note 101, at 1543-1544. 
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For reasons explained above, I would far prefer Con-
gress to the Supreme Court as the agent of change of Rule 
183 if there is to be change. Indeed, I would welcome 
(although not necessarily support) a serious legislative 
effort on those lines. As noted in Part I.A., the Tax Court 
did not explain the reasons for its rule change in 1983. 
One could venture a guess based on timing,117 but 
speculation is a poor substih~te f?r explanati~n. 
Hearings on proposed legislation would give the Tax 
Court renewed opportunity to explain why the 1983 
change was made and to present its view as to the. ~urr~nt 
importance or lack thereof of Ru.le 183. That. clarifica'.ion 
would be constructive. Based on it and other information, 
Congress could then balance the rule's benefit(s) against 
transparency and other values. The super~ority of those 
hearings and explanation over the less flexible process of 
117The year 1983 was within the period that saw substantial 
litigation as to the "first era" of tax shelters (as opposed to the 
current wave of shelters), and the Tax Court used STJs in many 
shelter cases. The 1983 change may have been made. for effi-
ciency, to move shelter and other cases more expeditiously. 
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litigation is a further reason why change, if any is 
desirable, should be effected by Congress, not by the 
Supreme Court. 
VI. Conclusion 
At its most basic level, Kanter I Ballard is about whethe 
we will take the chief judge, the judge, and the STJ a~ 
their word when they say that the court's opinion adopts 
the STJ's opinion. If we do, the principal objections to the 
decisions melt. I firmly believe we should take those 
officials at their word. Ours is an age of suspicion, and 
"trust no one" is a standard to which the c;:rucal readily 
repair. But that approach does not provide a sound 
foundation for judicial administration over the long run. 
In any event, the balance of the argument supports the 
decision of the Tax Court confirmed by decisions of the 
Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits. Affirmative values 
as to how courts speak and the nature of their delibera-
tive processes support these decisions, and the constitu-
tional and statutory arguments against them have signifi-
cant shortcomings. If (a big "if") Rule 183 should be 
changed, Congress, not the Supreme Court, should be the 
author of the change. 
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